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Abstract — Recently, Hwang has proposed a decoy
state method in quantum key distribution (QKD). In
Hwang’s proposal, the average photon number of the
decoy state is about two. Here, we propose a new
decoy state scheme using vacua or very weak coherent
states as decoy states and discuss its advantages.
I. Introduction
The security of conventional cryptography is often based
on unproven computational assumptions such as the hardness
of factoring. In contrast, quantum cryptography offers uncon-
ditional security based on fundamental laws of physics, par-
ticularly, the quantum no-cloning theorem. The best-known
application of quantum cryptography is quantum key distri-
bution (QKD). The goal of QKD is to allow two users to com-
municate in absolute security in the presence of an eavesdrop-
per. The best-known QKD protocol (BB84) was published by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1].
The procedure of standard BB84 QKD scheme is as follows.
First, Alice sends Bob a time-ordered sequence of single pho-
tons, each of which in one of the four possible polarizations—
horizontal, vertical, 45-degrees and 135-degrees. Second, for
each photon, Bob makes randomly one of two measurements:
diagonal or rectilinear. Third, Bob writes down the bases and
measurement outcomes and publicly acknowledges his receipt
of Alice’s photons. Fourth, Alice and Bob then broadcast their
bases. For the cases when they use different bases, they throw
away their polarization data. For the cases when they use the
same bases, they keep their polarization data. Note that in the
absence of noise and Eve, Alice and Bob’s polarization data
should be the same. Next, Alice and Bob perform some test
for tampering. For instance, Alice and Bob can pick a ran-
dom subset of their photons and broadcast their polarization
data. From there, they compute the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) of their transmission. If this QBER is larger than
some prescribed value, they abort the protocol. On the other
hand, if this QBER is within some prescribed value, then the
QKD protocol is successful and they proceed with key gener-
ation. Key generation may be done by applying two different
operations: a) error correction and b) privacy amplification.
The security of QKD protocols with ideal devices and, more
recently, with imperfect devices has been proven. Since a
single-photon source is an experimental challenge, a common
experimental source is a weak (coherent) laser pulse, which,
if phase randomized, can be regarded as a Poisson distribu-
tion in the number of photons. This means that there is a
non-zero probability of having multi-photons. In principle,
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Eve can perform a quantum non-demolition measurement in
photon number. If she sees a single photon, she suppresses
the signal. If she sees a multi-photon, she steals one pho-
ton and resends the rest to Bob. She may try to mask her
presence by the usual loss in a quantum channel. Note, how-
ever, that with such an attack, multi-photon signals exhibit
different outcomes from single-photon signals. For instance,
multi-photons give a much higher yield than single photons.
Recently, Hwang [2] has provided an ingenious method to
defend against the above attack by Eve. His idea is that, in
addition to regular signal states, Alice also uses some decoy
states. For each signal, Alice randomly chooses to send either
a signal state or a decoy state. After Bob’s measurements
of all signals, Alice tells Bob which signals are decoy states.
They can then compare their outcomes for the decoy states
and use their data to detect eavesdropper’s attack.
In Hwang’s original proposal, the average photon number of
the decoy state is about two and is, thus, rather high by QKD
standard. The goal there is to use the observed fractional loss
of the decoy state to constrain the multi-photon yield in QKD,
thus detecting eavesdropping attacks.
II. Our idea
We propose several new ideas here. First of all, we pro-
pose a refined data analysis where the specific properties of
the decoy state such as the bit error rate are analyzed sepa-
rately from the original signal. Second, we show that Hwang’s
scheme can be combined with existing security proofs of QKD
[3, 4], thus allowing rigorous proofs of security. Third, we show
that it may be advantageous to use either vacua or very weak
coherent states or both as decoy states. On one hand, by using
a vacuum as a decoy state, Alice and Bob can verify the so-
called dark count rates of their detectors. On the other hand,
by using a very weak coherent pulse as a decoy state, Alice and
Bob can easily lower bound the yield of single-photon pulses.
These two types of decoy states can be easily combined with
each other and with Hwang’s original proposal The usage of
decoy states may have some advantages. For instance, they
may provide useful testing procedure and may increase the
secure key generation rate, increase security and the distance
of QKD. One specific example is that they can achieve secure
QKD even at high loss.
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